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Introduction
Fiscal policy is expected to play an important stabilizing role over the business cycle. When the economy is accelerating, the fiscal authorities should be able to moderate activity by restraining the fiscal stance and, vice versa, in downturns fiscal policy can help stimulating the economy. Therefore, under these circumstances, fiscal policy is expected to behave countercyclically. However, the empirical evidence has repeatedly shown that fiscal policy has been procyclical in many countries, in particular in Latin America 1 . This is a rather unfortunate feature of the region, since it introduces an additional source of volatility to the economy, so that when the economy expands, it reinforces the expansion; when it contracts, it deepens the slowdown. Also, according to Serven (1998) , among others, the increase in volatility reduces investment and growth.
The neoclassical theory of fiscal policy [ Barro (1979) ] conveys tax smoothing as a way to accommodate transitory shocks to activity, as long as the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled. In those circumstances public debt fluctuations act as a buffer stock for shocks to activity and they enable fiscal policy to play its countercyclical role. The question is what happens when (negative) economic shocks strongly impinge on the level of debt, too, arising concerns about the fulfilment of the intertemporal budget constraint or, in other words, on the sustainability of debt. In those cases the mechanism is short-circuited and this can jeopardise the stabilizing role of fiscal policy.
This seems to be the case in Latin America. Gavin and Perotti (1997) have observed that there creditworthiness and sustainability concerns are central to determine fiscal stances.
The dependence of Latin American finances on external sources of credit and the periodic recurrence of sudden stops, that is, the abrupt loss of access to external credit and the volatility of financial indicators -reflected on volatility in the debt stock and service-are behind this situation. Furthermore, periods of difficult access to international capital markets tend to induce restrictive macroeconomic policies, but they also translate into large current account reversals, which are catalysed, among other channels, through economic downturns. The slowdown in economic activity aggravates the fiscal solvency which, in turn, calls for an additional tightening. Hence, the capital flow cycle and the macroeconomic policy cycle tend to reinforce each other, or, as Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) have labelled it, in these economies, when it rains, it pours.
As an additional argument, Riascos and Vegh (2003) argue that the incompleteness of financial markets in emerging economies could explain procyclical fiscal policy as the outcome of a Ramsey problem without having to impose additional frictions. . According to this view, the ability to run large budget surpluses in good times is severely hampered by political pressures which, though always present, get exacerbated in times of plenty. As a result, fiscal resources are wasted in favour of any rent-seeking group 1 . See, among others, Gavin et al. (1996) , Gavin and Perotti (1997) , Alberola rather than saved for bad times 3 . Lane (2003) provides empirical support for political economy factors in determining the fiscal policy stance in OECD countries. This notwithstanding, he recognizes that government debt constraints can seriously limit the room for manouver for fiscal policy in emerging markets.
It is remarkable that, notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is procycllical in Latin America, the empirical approaches in order to test the issue and explain the reasons in a rigorous way have been scant. The main reason has probably been the difficulty to derive adequate gauges for the fiscal stance in Latin America, due to lack or inadequacy of data and to the extreme volatility of macroeconomic and financial variables in the region. These factors have hindered the computation of structural fiscal balances, which is the most common indicator to assess the fiscal stance in OECD countries. That is why most papers have studied this issue analyzing the cyclical correlations between government spending, tax rates, the overall fiscal balance and the primary fiscal balance and the GDP cycle 4 .
In this paper, we aim at overcoming these problems in order to explore in a systematic way whether and how the perception of creditworthiness and debt sustainability is key to explain the procyclicality of fiscal policy. We build on previous evidence by Alberola and Molina (2003) , who show that in emerging markets fiscal balances are determined by the financing costs and that they are closely related to the cycle. Our approach is related to the empirical literature on fiscal rules and fiscal policy sustainability [see, inter alia, Bohn (1998) ]. The focus of this literature lies on whether governments react to debt accumulation by increasing primary balances or not, such that their fiscal behaviour is consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. However, in this alternativa approach the focus is on the mean reverting properties of debt, that is on long-run, thus dismissing, on the one hand, the cyclical components and on the other hand, the temporary swings in debt sustainability perception which are at the core of our hypothesis.
Our strategy consists of two steps. First, we check the procyclicality of fiscal policy.
Second, we search for an explanation to this behaviour, focusing on the perceived creditworthiness of the country, which, simultaneously influences and is influenced by the access to external credit.
To attain the first goal, we compute the structural primary balance for nine countries of the region for the period 1981-2004, taking advantage of recent improvements in filtering techniques to derive the output gap. The changes in the structural primary balance define the fiscal stance which is compared to the cyclical position of the economy: an increase in the structural balance at a time of economic upturn would signal a countercyclical and, thus, stabilising role for fiscal policy.
Secondly, the perceived creditworthiness of a country is closely related to its indebtedness position. While the level of debt to GDP is not too large, specially when compared to other developed countries like some EU states or Japan, Latin America suffers 3. The theory behind this argument is that interest groups view fiscal resources as a common pool and they compete for a share in that pool. Each group will be unwilling to reduce its claim on an increase in fiscal resources, knowing that the benefits of this moderation would accrue to other interest groups. Therefore, deviations from a countercyclical policy may be an indirect way of fending off spending pressure through, for instance, tax cuts when the economy is in expansion. But it will not be optimal to resist all spending pressures, so government spending is also expected to increase. 4. For a thorough discussion of the problems posed by this methodology see Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) .
from debt intolerance, as Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2002) have labelled it. This intolerance can be explained by the previous history of debt defaults, economic instability and weak institutions, which determine not only a higher financing cost, but also a debt structure that is biased towards foreign currency and short maturities. These features combine with the tendency to suffer dramatic swings in the financing conditions, which impinge on the perception of creditworthiness and may even cut off their access to the international financial markets. Under these circumstances, the critical debt thresholds are much lower than in the OECD countries and the financing conditions display a higher volatility.
Hence, the use in the second part of the paper of an indicator of debt sustainability to assess fiscal creditworthiness. Furthermore, debt dynamics are very sensitive to financing conditions. This means both that the assessment of creditworthiness can be quite volatile and that it can be self-feeding as long as the perception of vulnerability affects the evolution of financial variables. As a matter of fact, we depart from previous contributions by stressing the role played by current financing conditions in determining public debt sustainability. More precisely, we define the current threshold balance as the primary balance which renders public debt stable at each point in time. Primary balances above such threshold would imply that the debt is sustainable. This indicator will be used to uncover the relation between the fiscal stance and public debt sustainability.
We find a strong empirical backing for our hypothesis. First, the panel data analysis shows a strong and significant negative correlation between the changes in the structural primary balance and the output gap, so that they confirm that fiscal policy is procyclical in Latin America. After having stated this, we move on to show how debt sustainability issues affect the fiscal behaviour. The empirical evidence shows that a deterioration of the current threshold balance induces a fiscal tightening and that this tightening tends to be stronger the worse the initial debt sustainability position is
5
. These results can be taken as strong evidence that debt sustainability concerns play a determinant role in explaining the fiscal behaviour in Latin America and the procyclical bias of fiscal policy. In fact, it is shown that for most of the specifications public debt sustainability concerns seem to account, from a statistical point of view, for the whole procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the method employed to compute structural primary balances and studies whether fiscal policy is procyclical or not. Section 3 explains how an indicator of fiscal sustainability is constructed and then, it analyzes whether the fiscal stance is related to the sustainability of public debt.
Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
5. Note that this approach is somehow related to the empirical literature on fiscal rules and fiscal policy sustainability [see, inter alia, Bohn (1998) ]. The focus of this literature lies on whether governments react to debt accumulation by increasing primary balances or not, such that their fiscal behaviour is consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. The idea is that a positive response of the primary balance to public debt ensures that any upward movement in the debt to GDP ratio due to negative shocks (e. g., low growth, wars, higher interest rates) would be eventually reversed through primary surpluses. The procyclicality of fiscal policy
The specification of structural or cyclically-adjusted balances has centered a great deal of effort to come up with a universally accepted methodology to separate the budget balance into its structural and cyclical components. All the available methods involve two main steps. First, the cyclical fluctuations (output gaps) are derived by subtracting the potential or trend output from actual output and expressing the difference as a percentage of the former. Second, the cyclical component of the budgetary balance is estimated through the application of fiscal elasticities to GDP and, for some cases, commodity prices.
Finally, this cyclical component is deducted from the actual budget balance to derive the structural (cyclically-adjusted) component. This is the approach used by most of the international organizations and national authorities. The main difference among methodologies involves the calculation of the output gap, which is estimated either via a smoothing technique (Hodrick-Prescott) or through a production function [Giorno et al. (1995) ].
Structural balances is a widely used tool to assess the fiscal stance in industrialized countries, where the availability of long term statistics and the relative stability of the economic environment has allowed to develop increasingly improved techniques to filter out the cyclical balances. In fact, in the last years a preference has been observed towards the second method (which was already used by OECD and IMF), after the shift of the EC towards it.
Estimates of the cycle based on this method require the availability of reliable data on the use of labour and capital stocks.
In Latin America, the computation of structural balances has traditionally been hindered by the lack of long series of data, the extreme volatility of the macroeconomic variables and the noise in the fiscal data derived from dramatic structural changes and/or composition of revenues and expenditure. Furthermore the volatility of revenues is closely associated to the evolution of commodity prices and exports which, in several countries, are an important source of fiscal financing. Given these obstacles, and in spite of the recent efforts made in some countries, like Chile, the estimates of structural balances for the countries in the region are scant and a joint estimation of these balances for the whole region is, to our knowledge, non-existent 6 . Here, as a starting point to our empirical analysis, we aim at filling this gap by estimating the primary structural balances for the nine main countries of Latin America.
The methodology we will use to derive the trend output is smoothing through the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. Since it is being abandoned in OECD countries some motivation for this option is in order. First, lack of data availability and homogeneity. It is well known that labour statistics in Latin America are unreliable due to the importance of the informal economy and that capital stocks are difficult to measure in general, and more prominently in these countries; second, given the recurrence of economic crises, the concept of potential output that underlies the use of full capacity of production factors loses some clarity. In particular, if we think of the disruptions that economic crises provoke in these economies, the cyclical position is clearly not the only element which drives a wedge between potential and actual output. Finally, the recent refinement of filtering techniques allows for a more precise estimation of the cycle, also in the cases of variables with large variability, like in the Latin American case.
Estimation of the trend output and the primary structural balances
The trend output is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real GDP series.
Let Y denote actual real GDP and Y* real trend GDP. Then, the estimate of the output gap (GAP) is obtained taking the quotient of the difference between GDP and trend output, that is,
In practice, we proceed along the lines set forth by Kaiser and Maravall (1999) to improve on the performance of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Given the high volatility of Latin American output, we pre-adjusted the series by identifying outliers and then extracting them from the original series. These outliers were assumed to be transitory and were, thus, they end up assigned to the cyclical component of output. Also, to overcome accuracy problems in both ends of the series, we added forecasts and backcasts for further periods 7 .
At this stage, we used actual data for the beginning of the series and forecasts from Consensus Forecasts for the end of the sample 8 , instead of the model-based method suggested by Kaiser and Maravall (1999) .
Calculating cyclically-adjusted balances once the output gap measure has been estimated involves to single out the budgetary items which are assumed to display a cyclical pattern. In developed countries, such items usually involve different types of revenues and some cycle-sensitive expenditures, such as unemployment benefits. However, for Latin America, the lack of generalized unemployment subsidies and of appropriate data on this kind of subsidies advises for a simplified scheme, where only revenues (T), taken as a whole, are considered as cyclically sensitive. In order to filter out the cyclical part of revenues, the elasticity of T to activity is computed from the following regression.
so that the cyclically adjusted revenues TS are estimated as
Moreover, for an important number of Latin American countries, the revenues are heavily influenced by commodity-related taxes or excises, which also have a bearing with the level of activity and whose prices tend to be rather volatile, affecting the cyclical profile of public revenues. Therefore, it is customary to address the estimation of structural primary balances in these countries taking into account the evolution of commodities revenues. In our sample, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia -all of them oil exporters-and Chile (copper), 7. Part of the computations were carried out with the Tramo/Seats program developed by Gómez and Maravall (1996) . 8. Where there were no forecasts available we employed estimates from the IMF's Article IV reviews (Ecuador and Uruguay). 9. The fact that the elasticity is computed on overall revenues tends to exact too much cyclicality from the revenues. This is why it is also convenient to impose, as a robustness check, a unitary elasticity in the analysis as we will do in the next section.
where the share fiscal revenues from commodities is substantial, the computation of structural revenues and balance is accordingly modified:
where pcomm and p* are, respectively, the real prices of commodities and the notional real equilibrium price of the commodity, and the elasticities are estimated through the following regression:
The trend real commodity price (p*) is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real price series. This method provides a desired degree of homogeneity, but at a cost in terms of precision. The structural balance is computed by just substracting from the cyclically-adjusted revenues the overall public expenditures (Gt). However, in order to define more properly the fiscal stance it is pertinent, even more in Latin America, to deduce from the expenditures the interest payments on public debt (IPt), since this is a volatile source of expenditure which is clearly out of the discretion of the authorities. In this way, we obtain the primary structural balance (SPBt), according to the following expression, where it is important to note that all variables are expressed in terms of GDP,
The fiscal stance will be given by the changes in the structural primary balance (∆SPBt). An increase (decrease) in the structural primary balance signals a contractionary (expansionary) fiscal stance. 11. The elasticities have been estimated by Dynamic OLS (see Stock and Watson, 1993) . All the series have been pre-adjusted with TRAMO/SEATS in order to remove outliers that might bias the estimation. 12. The case of Chile deserves particular attention. Estimates for equation (5) yielded a negative elasticity for the real copper price, which is puzzling. Therefore, we decided to employ the GDP elasticities obtained by Marcel et al. (2001) and a unit elasticity for the real copper price, which would be approximately equivalent to the elasticity implied by their method. Results are not modified for copper-price elasticities around unity. In the case of the GDP elasticity, we present the results for the lower range of their estimates (which is between 0.7 and 1.25), though the results are not sensitive to this choice.
Fiscal stance and the cycle
seen in many cases that the fiscal stance is contractionary -SPB increases-when the output gap is negative, suggesting that the fiscal policy has been procyclical.
A proper statistical analysis of this hint appears in table 2A, where the correlation between ∆SPBt and the output gap is negative for both λs, except in Chile and, for λ=6.7,
Ecuador. By regressing both variables, it can be observed analogously that the slope coefficient is significantly negative -with 90% probability-in one third of the cases, and inequivocally so in Peru and Uruguay. In the second part of the table, which uses the value 100 for λ, Argentina and Brazil are also significant. Therefore, Chile seems to be the only country where the fiscal stance has been somehow countercyclical (a positive, though non-significant, relationship between the output gap and the changes in SPB). For the sake of completeness, table 2B performs the same computations but, instead of using the estimated elasticities, these are set to one, as it is done sometimes in order to estimate the fiscal impulse by the IMF , where it is apparent that a positive correlation exists in this case -which as it turns out is statistically significantdenoting the expected countercyclicality of fiscal policy. It is important to note, however, that the same analysis carried out for all OECD countries shows that in some of them fiscal policy -according to this criterion-has been procyclical, even significantly, at least for some parts of the period considered. This implies that the criterion is rather strict and that the procyclicality of fiscal policies is not an exclusive feature of Latin American economies, although here it has been more intense and protracted.
The econometric counterpart of this scatter plot is the panel data analysis which appears in table 3 13. The fiscal impulse also implies computing the structural public expenditures as a function of potential output, with a unit elasticity which is, after all, very similar to just taking expenditure as given. Another reason to look at this alternative measure is that the filtering out of overall public revenues with estimated elasticities, like in this case, tends to extract, by construction, all the cyclicality from the revenues, not only that associated to the automatic stabilizers.
14. Both the output gap and the structural primary balance come from the OECD statistics database. 15. The results are very similar when using a unit elasticity for public revenues. 16. These results may also be driven by the presence of Chile, which is the only country with some evidence of countercyclicality of fiscal policy. In fact, when this country is excluded from the sample, the negative sign recovers its statistical significance for the decade of the 80s. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of inflation on public finances. see Alberola and Molina (2003) .
very stable: it moves in a very narrow range between -0.10 and -0.15, and it is significant after the year 1997 is included. The lower chart is, alternatively, a rolling regression, starting as before in the seven-year window 1981-1987 but deleting and adding one observation at a time to keep unchanged the size of the window. Here, as expected, it is observed a higher variability but again it is relatively stable. Furthermore, in this chart it can be observed that through time, and mainly in the second half of the nineties, the fiscal policy tended to become more procyclical
17
. Only the recent recovery period seems to have bucked that trend.
17. These results are again reinforced if we remove Chile from the analysis. Debt sustainability and the fiscal stance
The results so far have robustly confirmed that, far from playing its expected stabilizing role, fiscal policy has been procyclical in Latin America: economic expansions have tended to be accompanied by expansionary fiscal policies, while the downturns of the cycle were worsened by a contractionary fiscal stance. The rest of the paper is devoted to explaining this puzzling result. Our main suspect is the influence that the concerns on the sustainability of public debt have on the fiscal policy stance through the cycle.
Obviously, the level of debt is a central element in this assessment and a fundamental constraint for fiscal policy, but it will only be expected to be effectively binding throughout the cycle when two circumstances concur: i) debt is high enough to influence fiscal policy in the short run, and ii) its financing conditions, including its cost, are closely related to the cycle. As suggested in the introduction, both conditions may hold for many Latin American countries.
An indicator of fiscal sustainability. The current threshold balance
This section is thus focused on developing a feasible indicator to explore the links between the fiscal stance and the debt sustainability concerns. Our indicator is adapted from a simplified, static version of the debt sustainability analysis, used among others by Blanchard (1990) 18
. According to the conventional definition, debt will be sustainable at any point of time when the value of current debt is lower than the net present value of future primary balances, that is, the fiscal balance once the interest payments on debt are deducted. This definition, simple as it is, faces the problem of not being operative, since it is quite difficult to derive the series of future fiscal balances or to impose a particular rate of discount on the future.
A more pragmatic approach is to determine the dynamics of debt, which evolves according to a limited number of parameters. From here it is possible to derive an indicator of fiscal sustainability which can be used for our purposes. The starting point is the fiscal budget constraint of the government, which can be expressed, after some algebra, as:
where PBt is the primary balance and Dt is the stock of public debt at the end of time t, both expressed as a ratio of GDP. There are two different types of debt to be considered: domestic debt and external debt, which have, respectively, a share α and 1-α in the total stock of debt, and their real interest rates are rt and r*t . ∆et is the change in the nominal exchange rate -where an increase in e represents an exchange rate depreciation-, and gt is the real rate of growth
19
.
18. This sort of analysis has gained pre-eminence in the last years in the framework of financing programs by international financial institutions, since debt sustainability is becoming an increasingly recognized pre-condition for lending. As a consequence, the toolkit for deriving debt sustainability paths is blossoming and becoming increasingly sophisticated.
19. This expression implies a first set of simplifications which are relevant in Latin America. First, contingent liabilities are not included, though they constitute an important consideration for fiscal sustainability; second, in the opposite direction, privatization receipts can be used to reduce debt and this is also relevant in the region, in particular during the 90s. Third, another type of debt, indexed debt, is also relevant in most countries. The debt, usually domestic, can be indexed Primary surpluses, which reflect the excess government resources over expenditure, reduce the debt stock, which is an increasing function of the domestic and foreign real interest rates and the exchange rate depreciation, and a negative function of growth.
From expression (7) a useful indicator of fiscal sustainability can be simply derived.
By just setting ∆Dt=0, the threshold value for the primary balance which would render the debt stable is obtained 20 . Above that threshold public debt will be sustainable. We will denote this value as the current threshold (primary) balance (CTBt): CTBt=PBt such that ∆Dt=0, that is, 
An important question is which horizon to use to derive the values of the right hand side variables. Since we have a particular interest on the evolving perception of debt sustainability and creditworthiness, the parameters that we use will be the observed ones, rather than the long-run equilibrium or trend forecasts, thus departing further from other approaches that assess debt sustainability 21 .
All in all, we aim at obtaining a threshold for the fiscal primary balance under the current economic conditions such that the ratio of debt to GDP remains stable. The data for computing the current threshold balance may not seem too demanding: interest rates on domestic and foreign debt, inflation, growth and the stock of foreign and domestic debt.
As mentioned in the first part of the paper, there exist data on total interest payments (IP), but data on domestic and foreign debt and their real interest rates is not readily available
22
Therefore, we need to develop a reduced version of (8) 
where ρ denotes the average cost of debt and, empirically, it will be implicitly derived by dividing the observed interest payments over the debt stock (IPt/Dt-1). Therefore, the current threshold balance can be computed as:
to the exchange rate, the interest rate and, as more recently, to the inflation rate. Indexation implies neutralizing the effects of the variable to which the debt is indexed in the above expression. 20. This indicator is based on Blanchard (1990) , who derived a similar indicator for fiscal sustainability, based on the expected mean values of the variables over a fixed finite horizon. 21. The IMF, for instance, uses forecasts for the variables of interest. 22. As in the previous section, the main sources for the debt ratios and interest payments are GFS and IFS, complemented with national statistics. In this case, the definition of government used is the consolidated public sector.
Hence, by employing the implicit real interest rate we can account, in a simple way, for all types of debt instruments used by each government. Besides, this measure also includes movements in domestic and foreign interest rates, as well as fluctuations in nominal exchange rates. We are interested in these variables, since we want to capture changes in concerns about public solvency.
The influence of the current threshold balance on the fiscal stance
Figure 4 plots the current threshold balance (CTB), country by country, along with the changes in the primary balances (PB) and the changes in the stock of debt. As expected, in most of the cases, it can be observed that when CTB is higher than the primary balance, the stock of public debt increases, and vice versa. The magnitude of the changes in the stock of debt do not correspond to the gap between CTB and PB, due mainly to valuation effects but also to the fact that the available data for debt usually refer to the whole public sector, including central government, public enterprises, regional government, etc, while the data on fiscal balances refer just to the central government in most of cases. This implies a certain inconsistency between public debt and the public deficit to which this debt is compared.
A persistent positive gap between the current threshold balance and the primary balance would deliver an unsustainable fiscal position, since debt would be continuously increasing. It is important to underscore that the graph compares fiscal outcomes with contemporaneous economic and financial conditions, so some caution is required when making assessment on the medium-term sustainability of debt from this compar-ison.
In any case, this seems an adequate framework to measure the impact of sustainability concerns on the fiscal stance 23 . More precisely, since we are particularly concerned with the dynamics of fiscal adjustment through the cycle, we focus on the relationship between changes in CTB and the changes in the structural primary balance (SPB). We would expect this relationship to be positive (see graph 5): a worsening in the perceived sustainability of public debt should be followed by a fiscal tightening.
Note that this is slightly different from the rationale linking the CTB to fiscal policy, since the current threshold is linked above to the primary balance (PB) rather than to SPB.
There are two reasons to proceed as we do. First, the SPB by definition filter out the cyclical conditions and therefore gives a more accurate view of the pro-active adjustment (call it discretion although this is not completely precise) that fiscal authorities have to undertake when sustainability concerns arise. Second, if PB is used, given that a cyclical downturn, as represented by a fall in g, implies a higher CTB and a lower primary balance, the expected positive correlation between CTB and PB would be blurred. In any case, on the one hand, the PB and the SPB will converge in the long-run and, on the other, we think that looking at this alternative can deliver interesting insights to the analysis, so we will present the results for both variables, PB and SPB. The scatter plot in graph 5 is a first approximation to this intuition, which now we intend to test in a more formal framework.
23. Certain outliers in figure 4 are related to specific situations which may distort the results, as the default in Argentina -which implied a great fall in interest payments-so this advises for taking such outliers out of the sample.
Empirical specification and econometric issues
The empirical analysis is framed within the following regression:
The impact of sustainability concerns on the fiscal stance can be assessed by regressing the changes of the structural primary balance (∆SPBt) on the changes in the current threshold balance (∆CTBt). A positive sign should be expected for δ2 in (12).
The simple relationship sketched here does not take into account an important consideration: the reaction of fiscal policy to the deterioration of the sustainability conditions is expected to be commensurate to the effective debt sustainability position, that is, not only depends on the changes in sustainability, but also on the existence and magnitude of a debt sustainability problem. Indeed, this is the gist of our argument. As suggested above, if there were no foreseeable sustainability problems there is no reason to restrain fiscal policy when the financing conditions -and the cycle, deteriorate. In such a case, fiscal policy is supposed to have a stabilizing role (reflected in a countercyclical fiscal stance). As explained above, the gauge for sustainability is the difference between the level of the primary balance and the current threshold balance, which can be denoted as sustainability gap.
Therefore, we introduce this term [PBit-1-CTBit-1], with a lag, in the regression, as a kind of error correction mechanism: in order to trim eventual sustainability problems, the structural balance will have to increase when the gap is negative, delivering an expected negative sign (δ3<0 24 ). The second expected impact is to increase the value of δ2, since the fiscal stance is expected to react less when there exists no problems of sustainability.
Finally, it is convenient to consider other variables in the regression, as controls, in order to obtain a cleaner picture of the actual impact of the financing conditions on the fiscal stance. These include prominently the change in the inflation rate, to account for shocks to seignorage and possible Patinkin/Olivera-Tanzi 25 effects, the log change in the terms of trade index, to control for the impact of commodity-price shocks on the public accounts
26
, and the output gap, in order to check to what extent the procyclicality of fiscal policy is maintained when the financing conditions are accounted for. We also include two dummy variables for the years in which a country's public debt securities were in default or its bank loans were in default (the Brady Plan years).
As regards econometric issues, equation (12) is repeated here for convenience:
where i denotes country and t year. The coefficient δ1i absorbs country fixed-effects, which may reflect differing fiscal institutions across countries, as well as measurement errors and other unobservable heterogeneity due to country characteristics. We assume that disturbances uit are independent across countries, but arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity across countries and time are allowed. The set of regressors used here could potentially 24. It would be more precise to use SPB instead of PB for this expression to qualify as error correction term. Actually, the results -presented below-are very similar with both specifications. 25. The Patinkin effect implies a positive effect of the inflation rate on the primary balance through the negative impact of inflation on public spending, while the Olivera-Tanzi effect acts the other way round, through a decline in real tax revenues as inflation rises. 26. Note that this variable should be non-significant, since we have filtered out from the public revenues the commodity price component.
include endogenous variables (correlated with the error term). The first obvious candidate is CTB, since a fiscal shock to SPB is bound to affect the estimate of CTB through both the real interest rate paid and the growth rate. Also, the variable (PBit-1-CTBit-1) can be regarded as predetermined, since it is expected to be correlated with past fiscal shocks on the SPB.
Another potential endogenous variable might be the change in the inflation rate, since it is quite agreed that in the 80s the Latin American inflation process had predominantly a fiscal motivation.
To address the problem of possible omitted variable bias induced by the presence of country fixed effects, we will rely on equation differencing, except when the fixed effects estimator is used. Also, to address the problem of endogeneity, instrumental variable (IV) estimation methods will be used, where suitably lagged values of the original independent variables, including lagged values of the dependent variable, might be used as instruments for the right hand side variables of the differenced equation. In this context, since we are working with a short sample, we have to be very careful when deciding the estimation method used. One possibility is to employ GMM estimators, but as it is well known, these estimators can be subject to potentially severe overfitting biases in small samples when based on too many moment conditions [Bond (2002) ], and to a problem of weak instruments, since deep lags of the variables might be poor instruments.
Moreover, we are in a context in which N, the number of countries, is small relative to T, the length of the sample period, so these estimators are not as robust as in the case where N is large and T fixed. In our context the fixed effects estimator would be consistent, but only under the strict exogeneity of the regressors, which as argued before, it is not the case.
Therefore, we will carry out our estimation exercise using two IV methods, besides the fixed effects estimator, in order to check the robustness of our results to the estimation method. First, we will use the GMM estimator in first differences [see Arellano and Bond (1991) ] with a highly restricted set of instruments, which in fact will be quite like the Anderson and Hsiao (1981 and 1982) estimator. This estimator is consistent in large T panels, but it is inefficient, since it does not account for the moving average process induced in the error term by first differencing. For this reason a GMM estimator à la Arellano-Bond with a highly restricted instrument set will be used. Second, given the high risk of overfitting in the GMM estimator, we will employ an IV estimator with just about 5 instruments, which will be suitable lags of the variables under consideration.
Results
Tables 4A-4C present the baseline results of the estimation exercise for the whole sample, and the different specifications and econometric techniques, using the changes in the structural primary balance (∆SPBt) as dependent variable. The values of the structural balance and the output gap correspond to those obtained with λ=6.7 in the H-P filter and with the estimated revenue elasticities. In general, the outcome of the analysis is strongly supportive of our hypothesis and is robust to the choices of other λs and public revenue elasticities.
Column (1) of each table shows the results of the simplest model in which only the changes in the current threshold balance are included. As sustained in the previous section, this variable positively, and significantly, affects the structural primary balance. Besides, when the sustainability conditions, embodied by the sustainability gap, are included in the regression [column (2)], the coefficient associated to changes in CTB increases its point estimate and becomes somehow more significant, while the error correction coefficient is negative and highly significant. This can be taken as a strong evidence that countries adjust their fiscal stance to changes in the sustainability conditions, but to a greater extent when the degree of sustainability of debt becomes a genuine concern. Also, the significance of the parameter in column (1) -when the error correction term is not introduced-is probably due to the existence of sustainability concerns in most of the sample (most countries and most periods as observed in graph 4).
Including the output gap in column (3) allows to determine whether the results in the previous sections, which strongly backed the procyclicality of the fiscal stance in Latin America, are maintained when controlling for debt sustainability. The parameter obtained in table 3 for the equivalent regression was -0,14 and it was highly significant. The parameter associated to the output gap in column (3) of table 4A has decreased to -0.11 but it is still significant. The interpretation for this result would be that, from an econometric perspective, the procyclicality of the fiscal stance could not be completely explained by the debt sustainability considerations. However, since the fixed effects estimator does not account for regressor endogeneity, this estimate is biased. When proper estimation methods are employed [see column (3) of tables 4B and 4C], the output gap coefficient is no longer significant (although it retains its negative sign), lending support to the hypothesis that the sustainability concern is the main factor driving the behaviour of fiscal policy in Latin America. . This effect is enough to drive a wedge between the results of the primary balance and the structural primary balance. Notwithstanding this, when the error correction term is introduced, in column (2), the results are similar to those of tables 4A-4C, although with a lower degree of significance. Another interesting result is that in this case the change in the terms of trade is positive and statistically significant, as one would expect, since the overall primary balance has not been filtered out for the effects of commodity prices. Moreover, the coefficient for the inflation rate is positive and highly statistically significant, lending support to the hypothesis that inflation has a positive impact on the public accounts.
27. The correlation between ∆CTB and the output gap is negative and strongly significant.
Conclusions
The procyclicality of Latin American countries fiscal policy is another unfortunate feature of the region that exerts a destabilizing effect on activity. The robust evidence presented in this paper, both on the procyclicality of fiscal policy and its close link with debt sustainability concerns, underscores the deep relationship of this feature with the general financial problems of this region. Indeed, financial vulnerability in Latin America is not only related to the level of debt but to the volatility of financing conditions and its impact has on the financing ability of fiscal authorities. Therefore, key words in the economic tribulations of the region in the last decades like original sin or debt intolerance exert also a durable influence on the behaviour of fiscal policy, as we have shown.
Looking ahead, the improvement in the financing conditions and the improvement of vulnerability indicators in the last years would suggest that fiscal policy may achieve a stabilizing role in the next cycles. However, the evidence for the recent years does not back this presumption. As a matter of fact, after a severe fiscal adjustment in the previous downturn (years [2001] [2002] ) the current recovery has also implied an improvement in the fiscal accounts in terms of revenues and expenditure, even after controlling for the cycle.
It must be stressed in any case that fiscal discipline, and the commitment to it by fiscal authorities is perceived to be higher. This bodes well for the future, but it cannot be disregarded that a future downturn if accompanied by a financial crunch will, again, drive the fiscal policy into a restrictive stance.
Also note that the bottom line of the paper, v. g., that sustainability concerns impinge on the fiscal stance over the cycle, do not always or necessarily point to the fiscal indiscipline of the fiscal authorities. It could be argued, on the contrary, that fiscal policy is forced to adjust to financial circumstances, some of which fall beyond the control of the policymakers as we know. All in all, what is clear is that the more sustained and decisive is the fiscal discipline effort the less debt sustainability concerns will play a role in determining fiscal policy, since countries will reduce their fiscal vulnerability and enhance their creditworthiness. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively FE: fixed-effects estimator; RE: random effects estimator Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively GMM: GMM difference estimator (See Arellano and Bond, 1991) . PB(-2)-CTB(-2) used as only instrument.
TABLES

Panel regression, Fixed Effects estimator
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, GMM difference estimator Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively IV: IV estimator for the differenced equation. D(CTB) and PB(-1)-CTB(-1) instrumented with SPB(-2), CTB(-2), PB(-2)-CTB(-2) and GAP(-1). Sargan-Hansen Tests of overidentification restrictions.
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively GMM: GMM difference estimator (See Arellano and Bond, 1991) . PB(-2)-CTB(-2) used as only instrument.
Panel regression, IV estimation
Panel regression, GMM difference estimator Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant. Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively IV: IV estimator for the differenced equation. D(CTB) and PB(-1)-CTB(-1) instrumented with DCTB(-2), PB(-2)-CTB(-2), PB(-3)-CTB(-3), Dinflation(-1), GAP(-1) and GAP(-2). Sargan-Hansen Tests of overidentification restrictions.
Panel regression, Fixed Effects estimator
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant. 
